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2Table of Variables
In alphabetical order:
 daily discount factor
 multiplier for cumulative stock of work constraint
 rate of time preference
 (!)= u (1 − !)+u (1 − !)!
! work rate
() probability distribution function of ~ N
a marginal aversiveness of work
I number of days taken to complete M
lt leisure at time t
M initial amount of work to be completed before uncertainty resolved
~ N uncertain remaining work requirement
N
I cutoff remaining work requirement for last stage beginning at I
P penalty
R required hours of work
t time index
T number of days until deadline (including day 0)
u() utility of leisure
Ui() discounted utility of leisure in stage i
Vi() discounted value of stage i
wt work at time t
31 Introduction
It’s a familiar scene: the last day of classes and the day the term paper is due. Students
straggle in, some depositing papers only to turn around and head back to bed; some take
a seat but appear to mistake it for that other piece of furniture; and the rest struggle to
pay attention to the lecture, most offering up little more than a blank, red-eyed gaze to
the board. At these times, both students and professors must wonder, why do they put
themselves through it? (Of course, professors may not really ponder this question until the
morning the grade sheets are due.)
Procrastination, particularly in academics, has been the source of several psychological
studies, but few economic ones. Presumably, this dichotomy exists because psychologists
love to explore irrational behavior and economists usually restrict themselves to rational
conduct — and procrastination is perceived to be irrational. Freudians Blatt and Quinlan
(1967) attribute procrastination to an attempt to avoid “unconscious death anxiety”: “By
being continually late, the procrastinator is expressing rebellion at the ﬁnality of his or her
existence.”3 Missildine, another psychoanalyst of the 1960s, blames poor childrearing as
the cause: “an overindulgent parent encouraging underachievement, or an overdemanding
parent encouragingrebelliouslassitude.”4 However,if not rational,the behavioris certainly
normal: Ellis and Knaus (1977) estimated that 95% of college students procrastinate. More
recently, empirical studies (such as Aitken (1982), Solomon and Rothblum (1984), and
McCown, Petzel and Rupert (1987))have concentrated on the correlation between procras-
tination and certain psychological or personality traits, such as compulsiveness, anxiety,
and extraversion.
Some economists have also taken the perspective of irrational procrastination. Ak-
erlof (1991) studied procrastination when a task requires action at a single point in time.
Opportunity costs of time today are more salient than those tomorrow; that is, today’s op-
3McCown, Petzel, and Rupert (1987), p. 781.
4ibid.
4portunities are clear while tomorrow’s are vague, making the former seem more pressing.
With a “salience cost” to acting today, and none attributed to tomorrow, one always wants
to postpone action, even though thestream of beneﬁts is maximized with immediateaction.
But the dynamically inconsistent preferences generated by salience costs in his model are
not sufﬁcient to produce indeﬁnite procrastination: one must have irrational expectations
of the future. If a person realizes she will want to postpone again every day, the rational
expectations strategy is to perform the task at once. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) also
examine the decision to procrastinate a one-time task with Akerlof-style salience costs, al-
lowing for rewards or costs to be salient and expectations to be sophisticated (rational) or
na¨ ıve.5
However, not all tasks require a one-time action. This paper considers a particular type
of task, distinct from Akerlof’s: work that can be divided into many (if not an inﬁnite
number of) small actions to be completed over time, such as writing a term paper. Nor is
procrastination always characterized by missing deadlines or abandoning tasks; procrasti-
nation can exhibit itself in an increasing workload, as more of the task is performed the
closer the deadline.
Academic procrastinationis a familiarexample: assignments maybe handed in ontime
yet procrastination is deemed to have occurred since much of the work was accomplished
at the eleventh hour. But can delaying enough of the effortto such a point as the discomfort
of all-nighters really be rational?
Modeling time as an exhaustible resource, this paper shows that simple impatience of-
fers a reasonable theoretical explanation of dynamically consistent procrastination. The
next section overviews some of the observations psychologists have made regarding pro-
crastinating behavior. Section 3 develops the time allocation decision as an exhaustible
5They show that rational expectations can still allow for some procrastination. For example, in a four-
period model, if the task is worth performing in period 4, and knowing this the person in period 3 will
procrastinate, theperson in period 2 may ﬁnd waitingtwo more periods for thereward too costly and want to
performit. Consequently,the personintheﬁrst periodwillprocrastinate, conﬁdentthetask willbe performed
















6The Psychologyof Procrastination: Some Stylized Facts
 Procrastinationis pervasive.
95% of college students procrastinate. [5]
46% nearly always or always procrastinate n writing a term paper. [23]
 Major reasons cited for procrastination: [23]
1. Too many other things to do (61%)
2. Task is aversive (47+%)
3. Felt overwhelmed by the task (40%)
4. Fear of failure (14+%)
 Easier tasks are performed ﬁrst. [17]
 Procrastinators are more likely to miss deadlines. [2]
 Extraverts procrastinate more. [17]
 Procrastinationis perceived to be a problem. [23]
This paper will address each observation in turn, showing that almost every one can be
explained by a rational model of time allocation. The notable exception is the last obser-
vation, prompting discussion of modiﬁcations to the rational model to deal with problem
procrastination.
3 Model
Posing the problem succinctly, when the work requirement demands many units of effort
over a ﬁnite amount of time, when will that effort take place? The answer lies in the simple
ideathatleisuretimeisanexhaustibleresource. When aﬁxed amountofworkmustbedone
by a distant deadline, leisure time in the interim is an exhaustible resource to be consumed
over time until the deadline, subject to a cumulative stock constraint. People like leisure
and prefer it sooner rather than later; time can be allocated between work and leisure, but
a certain amount of cumulative hours of work is required by some deadline. The person
thus weighs the gains from taking leisure now against the utility costs of having to do more
work later.
7Suppose a person gets utilityu(lt)forl hoursof leisureon any day t, and assume u() is
strictly increasing and concave. Let  represent the daily discount factor. R hours of work
are required to write a paper, the deadline for which is T days from now. A maximum of
24 hours per day can be spent working on the paper;6 leisure thus equals the excess of 24
over wt hours of work: lt =2 4−w t . What is the optimal allocation of time into leisure
and work from now until the deadline?
We can think of leisure time as an exhaustible resource with a stock size of 24T − R
(assumed to be positive; i.e., the task is feasible). In addition, we have a maximum daily
extraction rate—a capacity constraint—of 24 hours. The student maximizes her utility
from leisure subject to the work requirement:













The multiplier on the workconstraint,  represents the shadow value of another hour of
leisure. The resulting ﬁrst-order conditions are really those found by Hotelling. One of the
following pairs must hold for all t:
(a)0 <w t<24;u
0 (24 − wt)
t = ;
(b) wt =0 ;u
0 (24)
t  ;
(c) wt =2 4 ;u
0 (0)
t  ; (2)
These conditions imply that for any 0 <w t<24, the marginal utility of leisure (MUL)
will be growing at the rate of time preference, which in turn implies that wt will rise mono-
tonically over time. Figure1 shows the “daily labor supply” curve for a log utility function.
The student works until her discounted marginal utility of leisure equals the shadow value
of work.
6Those of less hardy stock who need a minimum of sleep may feel free to pick a smaller number.
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That is, if  is strictly positive, the work constraint is binding and cumulative hours of
work just equal the requirement; if the constraint does not bind (cumulative work hours ex-
ceed the requirement), then  will be zero. But psychologists and economists alike should
recognize that doing more work than necessary is never rational, for if (3b) holds and u()
is strictly increasing, then (2b) implies that wt =0for all t 2 [0;T−1].I no t h e rw o r d s ,e x -
tra work requires leisure to be foregone and, in the context of this model, has no offsetting
beneﬁt; thus, cumulative work hours must exactly equal the requirement.
If marginal utility at no leisure is ﬁnite, this value is essentially the “choke price.” Once
the MUL reaches this level, no leisure is consumed and the student works nonstop 24
hours per day. Suppose the choke price were reached at the last day of work. The student
works a little bit more each day until she spends the entire day before the deadline writing.
The cumulative hours of work implied by this path are unlikely to equal the requirement
except by pure chance. If the work requirement were less, the entire path would shift down
(lowering the MUL and wt for all t and thus lowering the cumulative hours of work until
they equalled therequirement),and thechokepricewouldnever bereached; in otherwords,
9even at the end she would not spend the entire day working. On the other hand, if the work
requirement were greater, the choke price would be reached before the deadline, and the
student would spend the last days working nonstop on the paper. This situation is depicted
in Figure 2.7


















































If marginal utility at all leisure is strictly positive, the student is “capacity constrained”
at a maximum leisure extraction rate of 24 hours. For small enough work requirements the
student does no work at all initially, waiting until the discounted MUL equals the shadow
value of work. In a sense, the student would like to be taking more than 24 hours of leisure
in the day, but is bound by the technological constraint of the earth’s rotation. Thus, she
does no work until that constraint no longer binds. Figure 3 shows this path.8
In the presence of a binding capacity constraint and a choke price, a situation can be
generated wherethe student plays all day at the beginning, then builds up her workload and
works nonstop at the end. A special case is that of Nordhaus (1973), where marginal utility
is constant at c. In this case, the student’s day is never split between work and leisure;
she plays all day, as long as −t<c , and then starts working full-steam once −t>c .
Accordingly, R=24 days are spent working and the preceding T − (R=24) days are spent
playing.
7Figure2 uses quadratic utilityand a discount factor of .95.
8Figures 3 and 4 use log utilityand a discount factor of .95.


















































Thus, the shape of the utility function helps determine how quickly the student builds
up her workload (and builds down her leisure) over the time period. Substituting in leisure












The ratio (1 − )= equals the rate of time preference. The bracketed term is the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution (also the inverse of the Pratt-Arrow measure of relative
risk aversion). Thus, leisure hours decline faster over time the greater the discount rate and
the greater the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. A larger change in leisure hours im-
plies a fasterbuildup of work,meaning that forthe same cumulativenumber of work hours,
the student starts out doing less work and does more later. In other words, the student will
procrastinate more the more heavily she weights current consumption of leisure and the
less she minds large swings in leisure consumption.
9The preceding steps start with the ﬁrst-order condition (2a) and approximate the change in marginal
utilityto ﬁnd the change in lt:




tive on some of those studies. Solomon and Rothblum (1984) found that “Aversiveness of
the Task” was the major factor cited by procrastinators to explain their behavior.10 Disutil-
ity of work can be easily added to the model, functioning like a variable cost of extraction
in the natural resource analog — a negative cost.
Let marginal disutility of work be a constant a. Deﬁne “net utility” as utility from
leisure minus disutility from work: u(lt) − (24 − lt)a. The new ﬁrst-order conditions
require that marginal net utility rise by the discount rate: u0(lt)+a= − t . As a result,
marginal utility of leisure rises more steeply; Figure 4 illustrates this change in the time
path of marginal utility.











































The cost to working acts like a subsidy to taking leisure. Constant marginal disutility
of workhas the effect of raising the elasticity of intertemporalsubstitution, causing the rate











10In theirstudyof reasons forprocrastination,task aversion had several questionresponses associated with
it, leading the 47% estimate to be a lower bound. [23]
12McCown, Petzel, and Rupert (1987, henceforth MPR) also observed that procrastina-
tors tend to perform the easier tasks ﬁrst, putting off the more difﬁcult ones. This behavior
conforms with the predictions of standard natural resource theory that, if an extractor is
free to draw down deposits of differing costs, the least costly deposit will be extracted ﬁrst.
Consider the simple case of a two-task project where one task is simpler (less aversive)
than the other, and the tasks both need to be completed by a single deadline, although in no
particular order. Suppose the student performed some of the more aversive task before she
ﬁnished the easier task; if she switched one of those earlier hours of hard work for one of
those later hours of easy work, both tasks would still be completed by the deadline, but her
welfare would increase: her utility from leisure would remain unchanged in every period,
but she would gain discounted net utility from putting off the harder work. Thus, the opti-
mizing student will work on only one task at a time, beginning with the less aversive one
and moving on to the more difﬁcult one after the ﬁrst is completed.11
3.2 Procrastination under Uncertainty
While procrastination may be characterized by a rapid buildup in the workload, procrasti-
nators are often identiﬁed by their failure to meet deadlines. Aitken (1982) proposed that
the main problem of procrastinators is an inability to estimate adequately the amount of
time needed to perform the task. However, prediction abilities held equal, high procras-
tinators may be more likely to miss deadlines just because they have the aforementioned
characteristics: higher rates of time preference, elasticity of intertemporal substitution, or
task aversion.
Suppose the actual work requirement is not initially known. How does this uncertainty
11The literature in this area of natural resource economics is broad. Herﬁndahl (1967) considers nonde-
creasing marginal costs, ﬁnding that one should always extract the next unit from the resource pool with the
lowest marginal cost. Weitzman (1976) develops a more general method, allowing for marginal costs to de-
crease with cumulative extraction, which dictates extracting from the resource pool with the lowest implicit
cost, the minimum of the average costs over different ranges of consecutive extraction. For task aversiveness,
this rule means the student may start ﬁrst on a task for which the initialunits of effort are difﬁcult,as long as
it gets easier and over some range is easier on average than the other task, which requires less effort to start.
13affect the optimal allocation of work and leisure?12
Performance of an uncertain task is somewhat analogous to the problem of extracting
from a resource pool of uncertain size. Resource use with reserve uncertainty has been
treated in different ways in the natural resource literature, mostly falling into the “cake-
eating” genre, since the exhaustible resource problem is analogous to consuming a cake
of uncertain or changing size. Gilbert (1979) and Loury (1978) model problems in which
the size of the reserves is ﬁxed but unknown, and more information becomes revealed as
the resource is used. Among their results is that uncertainty implies a more conservative,
i.e., slower, extraction policy.13 This subsection discusses brieﬂy the impact of uncertainty
itself on procrastination, which is quite different from the standard resource model. How-
ever, the main question at hand is whether high procrastinators are more likely than low
procrastinators to miss a deadline, given the same information about the distribution of an
uncertain work requirement.
The model of procrastination under uncertainty is more easily presented in continuous
time; to this end, let  be the rate of time preference and ! 2 [0;1] represent the instanta-
neous rate of work.14 Utility is now a function of the leisure rate, u(1 − !), and the units
of time can generalize to hours, days, or whatever is desired. This formulation does not
change the essential results.
Let us begin with a simple, two-stage model. (This model can easily be extended to
incorporate multiple stages, but the two-stage model sufﬁces for demonstrating the intu-
12Of course, there are many potential sources of uncertainty. Rewards may be uncertain; other factors
may render future marginal utility (i.e., the costs) uncertain. The evolution (and resolution) of uncertainty
over time will also affect work/leisure tradeoffs. Work requirement uncertainty, however, is certainly com-
mon, and this example illustrates how the presense of uncertainty itself can exacerbate the behavior of high
procrastinators.
13On the other hand, Pindyck (1980) models the effects of uncertainty when the reserves ﬂuctuate con-
tinuously and stochastically over time, ﬁnding that the resource may be exploited more quickly than under
certainty. This model could be used in an example where the professor’s expectations for the paper change
randomly, and the student gets information over the course of the semester rather than with the amount of
work being done.
14Whilecontinuoustimemay posesome conceptual difﬁculties,such as how onedividesan instantof time
between work and leisure, the mathematical presentation is more elegant and the basic results are the same
as in discrete time.
14ition.) Suppose an initial M units of work (say, the literature search) must be completed
before the remaining work requirement, ~ N, (how long it takes to write the paper) becomes
known. As in Gilbert’s model, utility from resource (leisure) extraction in the ﬁrst stage is
maximized given expectations about utility in the second stage, which depends upon how
much work is left to do.
The traditional resource model cannot be applied directly to procrastination, however.
Here, the resourceinquestion is leisuretime, but the uncertainrequirementis work; this in-
direct link between the resource and the constraint causes complications. The ﬁrst problem
is that the work requirement M is not associated with a particular amount of consumption
of leisure time in the ﬁrst stage. The second difference grows out of the ﬁrst: because of
the deadline, the optimal path in the last stage depends not only on the remainingwork, but
also how much time is left to complete it. The longer it takes to get to M, the less time is
left to complete ~ N.
An additional complication is that states may exist where the student prefers to drop
the course rather than complete the term paper. Implicit in the original assumption of
complying with the certain assignment is some penalty or reward making it worthwhile.
A ﬁxed penalty creates a knife edge in the incentives to work: if at any time the student
realizes the task is not feasible, the utility-maximizing strategy would be to give up then
and not waste any leisure trying. Furthermore, in some cases where completion is feasible,
for some combinations of penalties and remaining work, the student may prefer to give up.
If she deems the task worthwhile to complete, she optimizes as under the assumption of
making the deadline.
Therefore, the ﬁrst-stage problem solves for the path of work and leisure hours and for
the time I when M is reached, knowing the last-stage response to any given N and I and
the distribution of ~ N. This response must also depend on the penalty. If, arriving at I,t h e
student realizes completing the paper is infeasible, she will stop work (drop the course) and
accept the penalty at theend (perhapssummer school). If the N she realizes at I is feasible,
15she still must weigh her alternatives: continue working or give up now.
Let U0(N;I) be the maximized discounted utility of completing work requirement N
by time T starting at time I:











The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to !t are essentially the same as those in (2):
(a)0 <! t<1 ;u 0 (1 − wt)e−t = 0;
(b) !t =0 ;u 0 (1)e−t  0;
(c) !t =1 ;u 0 (0)e−t  0: (7)
In other words,within thestage, for !t 2 (0;1), the marginal utilityof leisure will grow
at the discount rate.
The value of the last stage is the larger of discounted utility from either ﬁnishing the
project or stopping work and accepting the penalty P.L e tV 0=V ( N;I) be the value of
the maximized last-stage utility stream net of the penalty in the states where the deadline is
not met, discounted to the beginning of the ﬁrst stage:
V0(N;I)=m a x

U 0( N;I);U 0 (0;I)−e −TP
	
: (8)
Since a higher workload and less time until the deadline both lower U0(), V0() is also
decreasing (though not necessarily strictly) in both variables.
Once the last stage is reached, the remaining work requirement is revealed and opti-
mization proceeds under certainty. For any starting time I, the value of working declines
as the workload becomes more burdensome, while the value from quitting remains con-
stant. At the workload where these values cross, the student is just indifferent between
ﬁnishing the course and dropping. Figure 5 depicts her alternatives as a function of the
16remaining workload.
Figure 5: Value of the Last Stage Given I




























In the ﬁrst stage, however, ~ N is not known and the optimal work path depends on the
expected value of utilityin the last period. The expected valueof thelast stage, and thereby
the incentives for timing the completion of the ﬁrst stage, depends on the distribution of












( ~ N)d ~ N; (9)
where ( ~ N) is the probability distribution function. N
I is the cutoff remaining workload:
for lesser workloads the student will ﬁnish, and for greater workloads she will quit.
Let U1(M;I) be the maximized discounted utility of completing work requirement M
by time I starting at 0:











In this case, U1(M;I) is strictly increasing in I: Adding another unit of time spent
partly in leisure unambiguously raises discounted utility, which may then be further im-
proved by readjusting work rates to correspond to the ﬁrst-order conditions for !t.
In the ﬁrst stage, discounted utility from performing M by I and the expected value of




U 1( M;I)+Ef V 0(~ N;I)g
o
: (11)
In choosing when to complete the literature review and start writing the paper, the
student will want to extend I as long as the marginal beneﬁts in the ﬁrst stage outweigh the
expected marginal costs in the last stage. At the optimal I, the student would not want to







Let a negative superscript on I indicate the point immediately preceding the switch into the
last stage. The increase in ﬁrst-stage utility from stretching out the literature review a bit
more equals the leisure enjoyed at that point (!I−) plus the discounted marginal addition to
leisure on preceding days from smoothing:
@U1(M;I)
@I


















=( u (1 − !I−)+u
0(1 − !I−)!I−)e
−I: (13)
This equation is reduced using two facts: (i) according to the ﬁrst-order conditions,
discounted marginalutilityis constant, and (ii)thetotalreductionin workperformedbefore
I must equal that performed in the additional unit of time from extending I (i.e., !I−).15
Correspondingly, the decrease in expected last-stage utility from extending the liter-
ature review equals the leisure enjoyed at that point (!I+) plus the discounted marginal
reduction in leisure at all points in time from smoothing (in states where the work is com-
15More precisely, discounted marginal utility is constant when the subject is unconstrained; however, if
the subject is constrained, the change in !t is zero. This reduced form holds as long as the subject is not






















−T( ~ N)d ~ N: (14)
While lengthening I also lowers the cutoff work requirement, since at N the two al-
ternatives are equal in value, small changes in N do not affect the expected value of the
last stage.
Let  (!)=u (1 − !)+u 0(1 − !)!. Note that for a non-negative, concave utility
function,  (!)  0,a n d  0 ( ! )=− u 00(1 − !)!  0. The ﬁrst-order condition for I
(Equation (12)) can thus be more simply written:
 (!I−)=E f   ( ! I +) g : (15)
In general, the more work that must be done relative to the time remaining, the more
hours of work are performed each day (including day I). Lengthening the ﬁrst stage lowers
M=I and lowers !I−. However, lengthening I raises N=(T − I) and raises !I+. Thus,
extending I lowers the left-hand side of Equation (15) and raises the right-hand side; with
the optimal I the two sides will equal and the expected path of marginal utility will be
smooth. Thus, Equation (15) tells us that the more work expected to be done at the begin-
ning of the last stage, the more work will be done at the end of stage 1 (and each day in
stage 1, according to the FOCs). In other words, the greater the expected workload in the
last stage, the faster the ﬁrst-stage work will be performed.
Though not written explicitly, the equilibrium work path is also a function of the dis-
count factor: a lower discount factor implies a steeper path. Consider, for a moment, the
case where the last-stage work requirement is certain, illustrated in Figure 6. A student
19with a higher rate of time preference will be performing less work at the beginning of the
last stage (given any N and I). She will thus also be working less at the end of the ﬁrst
stage, which in turn implies the ﬁrst stage will take longer to complete.





























Under uncertainty, these incentives remain: given the same probability distribution of
theworkrequirement,astudentwith ahighrateoftimepreferencewill takelongerto dothe
literature review than one with a low subjective discount rate, leaving less time for the last
stage. Should the true requirement realized in the last stage prove to be much greater than
estimated, the high procrastinator has a greater chance of lacking enough time to perform
the task completely.
Furthermore, the high procrastinator, given any I and P, is more likely to want to quit.
Sinceshe discounts thepenalty at a higher rate, she is induced to complete thetask in fewer
states.16 A corollary of this result is that any incentive uncertainty creates to complete the
ﬁrst stage earlier is reduced. “Precautionary work” will be performed if uncertainty raises
the expected cost of postponement relative to that cost at the expected remaining work rate
(i.e., if Ef (!I+( ~ N))g  ( ! I +( E f ~ N g )),o r  (  )is a convex function of ~ N).17 With
16Proof of these statements is in the Appendix.
17I am borrowingliberallyfrom the language of the precautionary savings literatureof Kimballand others.
I will not discuss the application of prudence here, since precautionary work here is a function not only of the
relationshipbetween thethirdand second derivatives of the utilityfunction,but also therelationshipbetween
the work rate, the remaining work requirement, and the deadline. I will concentrate on the effect of the
quittingalternativeon expectations.
20the option to quit,  () is not a strictly increasing, convex function of ~ N, since above N,
  =0 . For a highprocrastinator, witha low N given any I, the expected value of  () can
actually be less than the value of  () at the expected ~ N,e v e ni f  (  )is a convex function
of !.
Figure 7:   and its Expected Value







































Figure 7 illustrates such a case, presenting  () as a function of N for both low and
high procrastinators (low and high rates of time preference). The solid lines show these
functions, and the dotted lines represent their corresponding expected values. Given the
same I, for any N,  (!L
I ) >  ( ! H
I ) . For a penalty that just induces the low procrastinator
to complete the project in any state, the high procrastinator will quit for some remaining
work requirements. As a result, while Ef (!L( ~ N))g >  ( ! L( E f~ N g )) and the low pro-
crastinator performs precautionary work, Ef (!H( ~ N))g <  ( ! H( E f~ N g )) and the high
procrastinatortakesevenlongertocompletetheﬁrststagethanundercertainty.18 Inasense,
this reasoning is the “fear of failure” explanation for procrastination (a reason afﬁrmed by
at least 14% in the Solomon and Rothblum (1984) study): 19 a high procrastinator knows
she will give up in more states, lowering the expected change in utility of the second stage
and causing her procrastinate more the completion of the ﬁrst part.
18This simple example uses log utilities,making  () convex in ! and ! linear in N, which is assumed to
be uniformlydistributed.
19As with task averesion, several question responses were associated with fear of failure. [23]
21Therefore, one need not conclude, as Aitken did, that high procrastinators miss dead-
lines because they are less able to estimate work requirements. By their nature of having
high rates of time preference, they take longer to perform the ﬁrst stage, possibly even
longer in the presence of uncertainty. Thus, should their estimates hit signiﬁcantly below
the mark, they are less likely to be able or willing to meet the deadline.20
3.3 Penalties and Multiple Deadlines
This result is important if someone (such as an instructor, university, or employer) wants
to reduce the incidence of failure to meet a deadline or submission of a product that fails
to meet expectations. Improving estimation abilities will not necessarily help. Either the
students (or employees) must be made moreconservative in their preferencesfor risk or for
time discounting, or some method is needed to make them do more work ahead of time.
Psychologistshaveconducted manystudiesofstudentprocrastinationin self-orinstructor-
paced courses with variousrewardand penalty schemes. Reiser (1984)found that in a class
presented with a pacing schedule, students facing penalties proceeded at a faster pace than
the control group. Wesp (1986) found that students in a section with daily quizzes com-
pleted course work faster and earned better grades than those with self-paced quizzing.
Lamwers and Jazwinski (1989) followed students enrolled in a self-paced course, each
facing one of four course contingencies for failing to meet the deadline: “doomsday”
(withdrawal from the course or failing grade), doomsday with tokens for early completion,
“contracting” (essentially close instructor supervision and pacing), and no contingencies
(baseline). Of the four plans, contracting was found to be the most effective method for
reducing procrastination problems, but also the most costly administratively.
The fact that some students make the deadline in the no-contingencies case reveals
that some reward is gained from completing the course. This baseline beneﬁt applies to
20McCown, Petzel and Rupert (1987) did ﬁnd in a lab experiment that procrastinators reported on average
lowerestimates ofthe time requirement tocomplete a reading assignment, althoughactual requirementswere
not compared to those estimates.
22all contingencies, and thus is an unnecessary complication when comparing the effects
of different penalty regimes on procrastination. I will address the two main alternatives,
doomsday and contracting.
Doomsday, in this paper’s model, is represented by the type of ﬁxed penalty just dis-
cussed. Increasing the penalty makes completing a feasible task more desirable; conse-
quently, the student will be doing the task in more states of the remaining work require-
ment. The expected workload at the beginning of the last stage will thus be higher, causing
her to perform the ﬁrst-stage work faster.
The contracting method forces students to do more work earlier by creating multiple
deadlines. Suppose the task is divided into two parts, which require R1 and R2 hours of
work by deadlines T1 and T2, respectively.
Work on the second part may be performed before the ﬁrst deadline. The student’s
objective function becomes
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If work on the second part is performed before the deadline of the ﬁrst, 1 = 2,a n d
the MUL rises smoothly to the second deadline as in a single-part exercise (where R1+R2
would have to be completed by T2); the ﬁrst deadline does not bind, and the student’s pace
23of progress is unchanged. If, however, the deadline for the completion of part 1 falls earlier
than she would choose on her own, she works on part 1 alone until T1 and then begins part
2. In this case, 1 6= 2, and the MUL rises steadily to the ﬁrst deadline, drops, and rises
again until the second deadline, as pictured in Figure 8.21 It is never optimal for marginal
utility to jump up at T1, since smoothing could be done by performing some of the second
task before the ﬁrst deadline.
Figure 8: Multiple Deadlines



















































Under uncertainty, havingmultipledeadlines with smaller uncertainworkrequirements
(and also smaller variances), high procrastinators are less able to postpone work and risk
missing the deadline. Theoretically, there should be some penalty plan which would result
in an equal expected failurerate as the multiple deadline scheme. However, for practical or
humane reasons, the corresponding penalty may not be implementable (except, perhaps, in
Singapore). Similarly, an equivalent reward scheme could be prohibitively costly. There-
fore, closer monitoringmay be the best method for reducing deadline failurerates.
Multiple deadlines may also be as much a cause of problematic procrastination as the
cure. In the real world, people usually have more than one task at hand, and the model
shows that the most pressing task with the nearest deadline gets priority while the less
pressing one gets postponed (“procrastinated”). “You had too many other things to do”
21Of course, the same variations seen in the single-deadline section can also be seen here.
24was the most frequently endorsed reason for procrastinating in the study by Solomon and
Rothblum (1984) (60.8% of the subjects). MPR found a correlation between extraversion
and procrastination; in one layperson’s interpretation, this correlation may be explained
in part by the fact that extraverts tend to be involved in more activities. Therefore, the
best way for a supervisor to give her assignment priority and reduce the risk of missing
the ultimate deadline may be to break it into smaller tasks with more deadlines to better
compete with the other demands on the student’s time.
3.4 Actual and Effective Discount Rates
The exhaustible resource model does a good job explaining the qualitative aspects of pro-
crastination — the effects of task aversion, multiple tasks, uncertainty and, in some cir-
cumstances, even the fear of failure. However, quantitatively, the implicit discount rates
required to generate such results under exponential discounting may appear unreasonably
large. In the basic model, the rate of decrease in daily leisure is the product of the discount
rate and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). Suppose this “procrastination
rate” is just 1 percent, which still seems low for the behavior we observe. Most empirical
analysis of consumption behavior has found an EIS less than or equal to one (or a risk
aversion coefﬁcient greater than or equal to one). Taking an EIS of one, the corresponding
daily discount rate of 1 percent then implies an annual subjective rate of time preference
of nearly 3800 percent! While some studies of hypothetical income and delay tradeoffs
have produced discount rates of that order of magnitude, of the studies of actual behavior,
such as thepurchase of consumer durables, thehigher estimates of discount rates areon the
order of 300 percent.22 Of course, parameters values obtained from intertemporal studies
of long-run consumption and savings may not apply to a model of daily time allocation.
Still, there are several ways to reconcile procrastination with generally lower discount
22These studies are cited in Loewenstein and Elster (1992) as evidence for time-inconsistent discounting:
pp. 61-2 and 137-8.
25rates. Some solutions work within the framework of exponential discounting. As just
presented, having multiple tasks can cause the student to postpone work on a particular as-
signment. Also shown was the case in which task aversiveness causes the marginal utility
of leisure to rise faster than the discount rate. Although productivity has not been dis-
cussed, it functions similarly to task aversiveness and variable production costs; if returns
are increasing to daily work (e.g., getting on a roll), the work path will steepen. Similarly,
setup costs to beginning a task can raise the average rate of increase in the marginal utility
of leisure.
Setup costs are like Akerlof’s one-time task, a ﬁxed loss that must be incurred at some
point in time. They could present themselves as an indivisible task which must be per-
formed before the student can proceed with the rest of the project, or a psychic or other
cost to starting a phase of the task.23 Operating in conjunction with divisible work, setup
costs can change the average rate of increase in the marginal utilityof leisure. The problem
is similar to a negative setup cost in the standard extraction model laid out by Hartwick,
Kemp and Long (1986), since here one must pay to start consuming less leisure. Suppose
the student faces a ﬁxed setup cost to beginning the paper. In choosing the time to start
work, she will want to wait as long as the gains from postponement outweigh the losses
from less utility smoothing.24 Marginal utility will jump up when work commences, lead-
ing to an equilibrium path which rises faster on average than the discount rate. Figure 925
shows how the path of work changes when a setup cost must be incurred at the start of the
task.
Of course, the value of postponing the setup cost still depends on the discount rate and
the EIS. The smaller they are, the larger the setup cost must be to generate a signiﬁcant
23Solomon and Rothblum (1984) reported that 39.6% of the students endorsed “You felt overwhelmed by
the task” as a reason for procrastinating. Having to overcome this sensation could be viewed as a setup cost,
though not necessarily a rational one.
24The problem is similar to that in the uncertainty section, but the gains to extending the ﬁrst stage in-
clude the decrease in the present value of the setup cost for the last stage. This raises the marginal value of
postponement, which raises the optimal value of I.
25Figure9 uses log utilityand a discount factor of .99











































But perhaps the true limits of the rational model are evidenced by the general per-
ception that procrastination is problematic rather than utility maximizing. Solomon and
Rothblum (1984) found that about half of American university students surveyed reported
that procrastination was a personal problem of “moderate” or more serious proportions.
Furthermore, 65% said they wanted to reduce procrastination when writing a term paper.
The prospective nature of the problem is revealing. Naturally, at the end of the semester,
the student wishes she had done more work (or procrastinated less); one always wants less
work and more time to complete it. However, if looking forward to next term she wishes
she could change the way she knows she will behave, then we have indications of a self-
control problem.
The rational model does not capture issues of self-control failures and undesired pro-
crastination. To this end, other explanations abandon the assumption of time-consistent
discounting preferences. For example, people may have different discount rates for differ-
ent things (say, work versus the reward) or different discount rates for the short and long
term.26 Fischer (1999) picks up where this rational model leaves off to explore the ef-
fects of time-inconsistent preferences and ﬁnds that, even with rational expectations, they
26These alternate formsof discountingcan be motivatedbythe types ofsalience costs modeled byAkerlof.
27exacerbate procrastination of a divisible task by raising the effective discount rate.
4 Conclusion
Of course, some psychologists and even some economists27 believe any type of time dis-
counting is inherently irrational. Abstracting from this debate, the simple model of impa-
tience presented in this paper offers examples of situations where procrastination can be
not only dynamically consistent, but also utility maximizing. Rather than contradict the
psychological literature, the model of time as an exhaustible resource offers theoretical un-
derpinnings explaining the results of several empirical psychology studies. It can easily
incorporate other adaptations for different types of tasks and incentive schemes and also
serves as a baseline for investigating alternate theories of time preference. The psychology
studies canofferfurtherinsights intohowpersonalitytraitsshape theindividual’snet utility
function and method of time preference, which in turn determine procrastinating behavior.
In conclusion, the resource model provides a useful framework for analyzing procrasti-
nation of a task performed over time and for examining policies to reform it. The question
is, when will we get around to it?
27Including the father of much of environmental economics, Pigou. For an interesting discourse, see
Ainslie (1992), p. 56.
28Appendix
Proposition 1 For any N, the minimumpenaltyrequired to induce work increases with the
rate of time preference.
The penalty that just induces work equals the discounted difference between all leisure




(u(1) − u(1 − !(R)))e−(t−T)dt (18)












(T − t)(u(1) − u(1 − !(R)))e
−(t−T)dt > 0: (19)
Note that since discounted utility is maximized with respect to !t, it is unaffected by
small changes in .
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